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“LAWFARE” IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM: A RECLAMATION PROJECT 
Melissa A. Waters* 
In the nine years since Major General Charles Dunlap first coined 
the term, “lawfare” has strayed considerably from its non-partisan, ideo-
logically neutral origins.  Nowhere is this clearer than in the war on terror, 
where the term is often used as a pejorative label by political pundits who 
decry as “lawfare” virtually any attempt to apply the rule of law to the con-
duct of the United States’ war on terror.  This essay considers the prospects 
for reclaiming “lawfare” as a useful term in the war on terror.  It explores 
various conceptions of the term, noting that a more ideologically neutral 
usage – lawfare as “critical self-reflection” on the relationship between law 
and war – is gaining ground in both the scholarly and public spheres.  It 
also argues that American lawyers and judges have a critical role to play in 
reclaiming the rhetorical high ground from pundits who attempt to equate 
the work of those involved in adjudicating terror cases with a shadowy form 
of “lawfare” engaged in by America’s terrorist enemies. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On rare occasions in the evolution of the English language, a new 
word or concept so perfectly captures an emerging phenomenon that it 
catches fire. Such is the case with the term ―lawfare.‖ Introduced into the 
military lexicon by Major General Charles Dunlap in 2001,1  ―lawfare‖ 
quickly captured both scholarly and popular imaginations. References to 
lawfare soon found their way into major media outlets,2 and the concept 
even won an indirect—and highly controversial—mention in President 
Bush‘s 2002 National Security Strategy.3 Just nine years after Dunlap first 
  
 *  Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.  
 1 See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian 
Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Carr Center for Human Rights, John F. Kennedy Sch. of 
Gov‘t, Harvard U., Working Paper, 2001), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/ 
Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/Dunlap2001.pdf. 
 2 See, e.g., Scott Malcomson, Lawfare, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 12, 2004; Andrew Cohen, 
Bench Conference: The Vice President Wages “Lawfare”, WASH. POST BLOG (June 21, 
2007, 4:33PM), available at http://blog.washingtonpost.com/benchconference/2007/06/lawf- 
are_from_the_vice_presiden.html; The Lawfare Wars, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2010, at A14. 
 3 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY 31 (2002) (explaining that the U.S. government will take the steps necessary to 
protect Americans against the potential for investigations and prosecution by the I.C.C. and 
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introduced the term, a Google search for ―lawfare‖ reveals an astounding 
84,600 entries, and at least two weblogs are devoted exclusively to lawfare.4    
Like a great trademark that eventually becomes a victim of its own 
popularity, however, ―lawfare‖ now runs the risk of losing its utility, as its 
original meaning becomes obscured and distorted over time. Dunlap‘s con-
cept of ―lawfare‖ was straightforward: He defined it as ―the use of law as a 
weapon of war,‖5 later clarifying that it involved ―a strategy of using—or 
misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve an 
operational objective.‖6 As he notes in this symposium, Dunlap did not in-
tend the term to have a pejorative meaning. Instead, he was introducing an 
ideologically neutral concept, whose goal was to capture an important 
emerging phenomenon and to encourage debate among military and legal 
strategists within the U.S. armed forces as to how best to confront and en-
gage that phenomenon.7 For Dunlap, lawfare is ―simply another kind of 
weapon, one that is produced . . . by beating lawbooks into swords.‖8 More-
over, as Dunlap convincingly demonstrates, lawfare is a weapon that is not 
only wielded by America‘s enemies, but also by the U.S. government itself 
in its global war on terror.9  
Unfortunately, as lawfare has taken hold in the popular lexicon, it 
seems to have lost much of the ideologically neutral cast of Dunlap‘s origi-
nal conception. Nowhere is this clearer than in the use of ―lawfare‖ in the 
debate over the war on terror. In this context, to put it mildly, lawfare has 
become a loaded term. The Wall Street Journal, for example, has used ―law-
fare‖ as a pejorative label to discredit the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) and other non-governmental organizations (NGO) who have ques-
tioned the legality of the Obama Administration‘s treatment of Guantanamo 
  
will implement the American Service members Protection Act in order to ensure the protec-
tion of U.S. military personnel and officials). 
 4 Google Search for ―lawfare‖, GOOGLE (Dec. 1, 2010, 3:00PM), http://www.google.com 
(search for ―lawfare‖; then follow the Google Search hyperlink); see, e.g., LAWFARE, http:// 
www.lawfareblog.com (last visited Dec. 17, 2010); THE LAWFARE PROJECT, http://www. 
thelawfareproject.org (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). 
 5 See Dunlap, supra note 1, at 5. 
 6 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT‘L. AFF. 146, 146 
(2008). 
 7 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Visiting Professor, Duke University School of Law and Asso-
ciate Director, Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security, Presented at Case Western 
University School of Law Frederick K. Cox International Law Center War Crimes Research 
Symposium, Does Lawfare Need an Apologia? (Sept. 10, 2010), available at http://www.au. 
af.mil/au/aunews/archive/2010/0520/0520Articles/Dunlap0520.pdf. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 2–4 (discussing lawfare as an American weapon). 
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detainees and other terrorist suspects.10 Conservative political pundits have 
jumped on the bandwagon by decrying as ―lawfare‖ virtually any attempt to 
apply the rule of law to the conduct of the war on terror. In so doing, they 
have not only condemned the actions of NGOs like the ACLU, but also the 
actions of judges hearing detainee cases and the military lawyers who make 
up the Guantanamo defense bar itself.11 
Clearly, ―lawfare‖ in the war on terror has strayed considerably 
from its non-partisan, ideologically neutral roots. Participants in this sympo-
sium have richly debated whether the original conception of ―lawfare‖ can 
be reclaimed. Scott Horton argues that the term was hijacked by the right, 
became ―a tool in a legal demolition derby,‖ and is thus ―irredeemably dis-
credited.‖12 Dunlap, on the other hand, urges us to rescue the hostage and 
restore lawfare to its original meaning. The key questions are whether such 
a reclamation project is possible, and whether it is worth the candle. Can 
―lawfare‖ be reclaimed from the political pundits and (re)developed into a 
useful concept for military and legal strategists in the conduct of the war on 
terror?   
While the outcome of such a reclamation project is far from certain, 
I think it is worth the attempt. But as the wildfire success of Dunlap‘s coi-
nage of the term ―lawfare‖ demonstrates, language matters. Thus the first 
element in a reclamation project is to restore ―lawfare‖ to its original con-
ception and to reassert the neutrality of the term. Lawyers, judges, and legal 
scholars have a crucial role to play here, as well. Accordingly, a second key 
element in reclaiming ―lawfare‖ is for American lawyers and judges to re-
take the high ground from those who wage ―counterlawfare.‖ In this brief 
commentary, I will discuss both elements in turn. 
II.  RECLAIMING A NEUTRAL CONCEPTION OF LAWFARE 
In the war on terror context, at least two conceptions of ―lawfare‖ 
are currently in vogue. The first defines lawfare as the use of law and legal 
processes as an instrument or weapon of war. It is this first definition that 
the political pundits have adopted as their own. But their use of lawfare 
goes a step further. They have reshaped this first definition into an example 
of what Wouter Werner calls ―reflexive lawfare‖: ―the use of the term to 
  
 10 Specifically, the Wall Street Journal condemned NGO efforts to stop the Administra-
tion‘s use of military commissions to try Guantanamo detainees, as well as its use of targeted 
killing of terrorist suspects. See Editorial, The Lawfare Wars, THE WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2010, 
at A14. 
 11 See discussion infra Part II. 
 12 Scott Horton, A Kinder, Gentler Lawfare, HARPER‘S, MAG. Nov. 2007, http://www. 
harpers.org/archive/2007/11/hbc-90001803. 
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discredit an opponent‘s reliance on law and legal procedure,‖13 or ―an in-
strument to discredit critics of the government.‖14   
While conservative political pundits have utilized reflexive lawfare 
to considerable success over the past few years, it is important to remember 
that reflexive lawfare in the war on terror finds its roots not in punditry but 
in the work of the U.S. Government. The highest profile use of reflexive 
lawfare to date was in the Bush Administration‘s 2002 National Security 
Strategy document.15 While the document does not utilize the term ―law-
fare‖ itself, it notes that the United States‘ ―strength . . . will continue to be 
challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international 
fora, judicial processes, and terrorism.‖16 As Scott Horton has pointed out, 
in the National Security Strategy document, ―turning to courts for the en-
forcement of legal rights, appeals to international tribunals, and terrorism 
are seen as the elements of a single consistent enemy strategy.‖17 Thus, the 
Bush Administration suggested that ―lawyers who defend their clients, or 
who present their claims to domestic or international courts, might as well 
be terrorists themselves.‖18 In short, ―[l]awfare, as defined by Bush Admin-
istration officials, is a terrorist tactic.‖19 As Horton has convincingly dem-
onstrated, the National Security Strategy was merely the opening salvo in a 
Bush Administration campaign to use reflexive lawfare to vilify the Guan-
tanamo defense bar.20   
While reflexive lawfare held particular sway during the Bush years, 
however, there is another, more neutral conception of ―lawfare‖ that may be 
gaining ground. Again, Professor Werner‘s paper for this symposium pro-
vides a useful description of this alternative approach. Rather than utilizing 
the term to discredit an opponent‘s reliance on law and legal processes, the 
alternative definition of ―lawfare‖ focuses on what Werner describes as a 
  
 13 Wouter G. Werner, The Curious Career of Lawfare, 43 Case W. Res. J. Int‘l L. 61, 69 
(2010). 
 14 Id. at 6 (discussing reflexive lawfare). 
 15 See U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 1, 5 (2005), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds2. 
pdf. 
 16 See id. at 5. 
 17 Scott Horton, State of Exception: Bush’s War on the Rule of Law, HARPER‘S MAG. 74, 
74, July 2007, http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/07/0081595. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Horton, supra note 17, at 75. Horton claims that the Bush Administration‘s strategy 
against lawfare has ―effectively declared war on the rule of law itself‖ by frustrating attempts 
to provide Guantanamo Bay prisoners with legal representation.   
File: Waters 2 Created on: 1/9/2011 7:08:00 PM Last Printed: 4/5/2011 8:14:00 PM 
2010] A RECLAMATION PROJECT 331 
kind of ―critical self-reflection‖ on the relationship between law and war.21 
He relies on David Kennedy‘s work, asserting that ―lawfare‖ can be used to 
describe the ―art of ‗managing law and war together.‘‖22 
This alternative, more flexible conception of ―lawfare‖ seems to be 
truer to Dunlap‘s original vision and has potential in restoring the concept 
of lawfare to its original ideologically neutral grounding. It contemplates the 
use of law and legal processes as an instrument of war, but it does not focus 
exclusively on this narrow definition, encompassing instead a broader dis-
cussion of the proper role of law in the management of war. Moreover, ra-
ther than condemning the use of ―lawfare‖ as a weapon that is wielded ex-
clusively by America‘s enemies, the ―critical self-reflection‖ conception of 
lawfare acknowledges the fact (which Dunlap has emphasized repeatedly in 
his recent writings) that lawfare is simply a neutral instrument of war, one 
that can be wielded by all sides in the war on terror. 
There is evidence that this alternative conception of lawfare may be 
gaining traction in the context of the war on terror. There is, of course, Dun-
lap‘s own recent scholarly work, and that of other scholars who are attempt-
ing to develop ―lawfare‖ into a useful rubric for military and legal strateg-
ists to explore the uses and abuses of law as an instrument of war. In so 
doing, these scholars are ensuring that in the legal scholarship, at least, 
―lawfare‖ avoids the pejorative cast that the term has taken on in the popular 
discourse.23   
Even in the popular discourse, however, change may be afoot. In 
September 2010, three prominent national security scholars founded a new 
blog entitled ―Lawfare: Hard National Security Choices.‖24 The blog has 
quickly emerged as one of the premier sites for serious discussion of nation-
al security issues. In introducing the blog, one of its founders, Benjamin 
Wittes of the Brookings Institution, offered the following explanation for 
the blog‘s appropriation of the term ―lawfare‖: 
  
 21 Werner, supra note 13, at 70 (discussing the ―critical self-reflection‖ aspects of Kenne-
dy‘s work, and noting that reflexive lawfare ―is largely decoupled from critical self-
reflection‖).   
 22 Id. (quoting DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW 125 (2006)). 
 23 See Dunlap, supra note 7, at 1–2. Dunlap categorizes lawfare ―as simply another kind of 
weapon‖ which can be used for ―good or bad purposes, depending upon the mindset of those 
who wield it.‖ See also Kelly D. Wheaton, Strategic Lawyering: Realizing the Potential of 
Military Lawyers at the Strategic Level (Mar. 16, 2006) (unpublished Masters of Strategic 
Studies Degree, U.S. Army War College) (discussing the role of ―both proactive and respon-
sive legal advice and support in lawfare‖ for military lawyers in engaging the war on terror), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf& 
AD=ADA449201. 
 24 See LAWFARE, http://www.lawfareblog.com (last visited Dec. 17, 2010). The founders 
and regular bloggers are Jack Goldsmith of Harvard, Benjamin Wittes of the Brookings 
Institution, and Robert Chesney of the University of Texas. 
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We mean to devote this blog to that nebulous zone in which actions taken 
or contemplated to protect the nation interact with the nation‘s laws and 
legal institutions . . . . The name Lawfare refers both to the use of law as a 
weapon of conflict and, perhaps more importantly, to the depressing reali-
ty that America remains at war with itself over the law governing its war-
fare with others. . . . It is our hope to provide an ongoing commentary on 
America‘s lawfare, even as we participate in many of its skirmishes.
25
 
Thus the new Lawfare blog reintroduces into the popular discourse 
a notion of ―lawfare‖ that is in keeping with the ―critical self-reflection‖ 
conception of the term.26 For those who worry that the term has been hi-
jacked and that an ideologically neutral conception of ―lawfare‖ has disap-
peared from the popular discourse, this blog provides some evidence that 
they may have sounded its death knell a bit too soon. 
III.  RE-TAKING THE HIGH GROUND FOR AMERICAN JUDGES AND LAWYERS 
Perhaps the most pernicious aspect of reflexive lawfare in the war 
on terror is that it is being used not merely to discredit terrorist suspects 
who attempt to assert their rights before the U.S. courts: It is also being used 
to discredit the lawyers who assist them, and even, in some instances, the 
judges who hear their cases. The most celebrated example of this use of 
reflexive lawfare is, of course, the infamous case of Charles ―Cully‖ Stim-
son, who served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee 
Affairs in the Bush Administration. In an interview in 2007, Stimson ex-
pressed his dismay that attorneys from major U.S. law firms were 
representing detainees at Guantanamo. He named several of the firms, 
hinted that their funding might come from terrorist sources, and com-
mented, ―I think, quite honestly, when corporate C.E.O.‘s see that those 
firms are representing the very terrorists who hit their bottom line back in 
2001, those C.E.O.‘s are going to make those law firms choose between 
representing terrorists or representing reputable firms. . . . And we want to 
watch that play out.‖27 
  
 25 Benjamin Wittes, Welcome to Lawfare, LAWFARE (Sept. 12, 2010, 12:58 AM), http:// 
www.lawfareblog.com/2010/09/welcome-to-lawfare-2/. 
 26 See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY:  LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 60 (2009). Jack Goldsmith, one of lawfareblog.com‘s founders, wrote a 
2002 memo for the Bush Administration in which he expressed concern about a growing 
―web of international and judicial institutions that today threaten USG interests.‖ See also 
Werner, supra note 13, at 68. Werner concludes that Goldsmith‘s views in the 2002 memo 
certainly reflect a ―reflexive lawfare‖ conception of the term ―lawfare.‖ 
 27 See Neil A. Lewis, Official Attacks Top Law Firms Over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
13, 2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/13/washington/13gitmo.html 
(discussing and quoting Stimson radio interview). 
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While Stimson reserved his criticism for law firms representing the 
detainees, others have attempted to discredit judges themselves. For exam-
ple, in an article entitled Lawfare Strikes Again,28 Andrew McCarthy of the 
National Review condemned a decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals holding that the President did not have inherent constitutional authori-
ty to order seizure and indefinite detention of an alien legal resident sus-
pected of terrorism.29 McCarthy wrote: 
Strike another blow for lawfare: The use of the American people‘s courts 
as a weapon against the American people in a war prosecuted by the presi-
dent—the only public official elected by all Americans—under an authori-
zation for the use of military force overwhelmingly passed by the Ameri-
can people‘s representatives in congress. And all for the benefit of an alien 
sent here to attack us.
30
 
Unlike Stimson, McCarthy reserved his vitriol for the judges who, 
in his view, had helped to free a suspected terrorist. He complained that 
despite the ongoing threat of terror attacks within the United States, the fed-
eral court had ―intervened on the enemy‘s behalf,‖ and he noted that it was 
―worth observing‖ that the decision to ―intervene‖ was written by a Clinton 
appointee.31 
A critical element in reclaiming ―lawfare‖ and restoring it to its 
original meaning is to re-take the rhetorical high ground from the Stimsons 
and McCarthys of the world. Those who engage in this sort of reflexive 
lawfare are playing an exceedingly dangerous game. By associating the 
work of American lawyers and judges involved in terror cases with a sha-
dowy form of ―lawfare‖ engaged in by America‘s terrorist enemies, con-
servative pundits like McCarthy discredit and undermine the rule of law and 
the legitimacy of the American legal system itself. For this reason alone, the 
project to reclaim ―lawfare‖ and to restore it to its original, ideologically 
neutral meaning is worth the effort. Given the high regard that they (still) 
enjoy with the American public, American lawyers and judges have a criti-
cal role to play in this restoration project. 
Nor should we underestimate the ability of America‘s lawyers to re-
take the rhetorical high ground and to discredit the work of the reflexive 
lawfare pundits. Indeed, Cully Stimson‘s story serves to illustrate the power 
that resides in the American bar when it chooses to engage in the battle over 
lawfare. Stimson‘s attack on law firms representing Guantanamo detainees 
was met with a firestorm of outrage by lawyers, legal ethicists, and bar as-
  
 28 Andrew McCarthy, Lawfare Strikes Again, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (June 12, 2007), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/221258/lawfare-strikes-again/andrew-c-mccarthy#. 
 29 See id (discussing al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007)). 
 30 See McCarthy, supra note 28. 
 31 Id. 
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sociation officials. The president of the American Bar Association led the 
attack, calling Stimson‘s comments ―deeply offensive to members of the 
legal profession, and we hope to all Americans.‖32 In response to the torrent 
of criticism, the Bush Administration quickly distanced itself from Stim-
son‘s comments. Less than a month later, Stimson resigned, with a Defense 
Department spokesman noting that the controversy had ―hampered his abili-
ty to be effective‖ in his office.33 Stimson‘s downfall was a major victory 
for America‘s lawyers, and proof that they can play a critical role in law-




 32 See Lewis, supra note 27. 
 33 See Pauline Jelinek, Defense Official Resigns Over Remarks, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/02/AR20070202009 
40.html. 
